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Resume:  
Drawing on the case of national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary, the article primarily 
seeks to focus on the challenge that the reconfiguration of and uncertainties around 
community boundaries might pose for democratic consolidation, and to analyse how these 
issues can be understood in this particular context. In line with the theoretical and empirical 
findings on consolidation, Europeanization and post-accession compliance, the paper aims to 
explore recent political and institutional changes in four key areas of minority protection 
(constitutional provisions, language rights, cultural autonomy, and parliamentary 
representation), most prominently the profound shift towards the ethnocultural definition of 
the nation in the new constitution, and critically assess their potential impact on minorities.   
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I. Introduction  
By the 2010s, especially due to the border changes and migration processes of the 20th 
century, to the accession to the EU, as well as to the recent extension of citizenship to 
Hungarians abroad, the configuration and boundaries of both the Hungarian political and 
ethnocultural community had been profoundly reshaped, and had become even more complex 
and diverse than ever before. As illustrated in Table 1, the increasing complexity necessarily 
leads to a greater need especially to address the effects and perspectives of the recent changes, 
including the recognizable shift in the legislation towards the ethnocultural understanding of 
the nation, and the redrawal of the boundaries of the political community, in each segment. 
The table raises a number of complex issues; however, this article has a narrower focus and 
concentrates on a single aspect, namely, that of the situation of traditional national and ethnic 
minorities – under the new terminology ‘nationalities’ – living in Hungary that has not been 
deeply analysed by recent scholarship.  
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Table 1: Basic types of citizenship constellations in the Hungarian political and ethnocultural 
community  
Description Hungarian citizen Hungarian national Living in Hungary 
Hungarian citizen, 
Hungarian national, 
in Hungary 
+ + + 
Hungarian citizen, 
Hungarian national, 
abroad 
+ + - 
Hungarian citizen, 
non-Hungarian 
national, in Hungary 
+ - + 
non-Hungarian 
citizen, Hungarian 
national, in Hungary 
- + + 
Hungarian citizen, 
non-Hungarian 
national, abroad 
+ - - 
non-Hungarian 
citizen, non-
Hungarian national, 
in Hungary 
- - + 
non-Hungarian 
citizen, Hungarian 
national, abroad 
- + - 
Source: Rövid 2013: 386.  
Although minorities in Hungary are relatively small in numbers, live dispersed, are at an 
advanced stage of linguistic assimilation, feel themselves closely attached to the state and to 
the overwhelming Hungarian majority, have not been politically mobilized in large numbers 
along ethnic lines, and with the exception of the largest group, the Roma are well integrated in 
socio-economic terms, the interpretations of the minority policy, most notably the system of 
the elected minority self-governments (MSGs) have been the subject of recurrent debates in 
politics and academia in at least two critical respects. First, debates about the potential 
implications of the kin-state activities targeting Hungarians abroad on the domestic minority 
issues that may exist, and second, the question to what extent the regime of non-territorial 
autonomy and minority rights are in accordance with the needs of the Roma, by far the 
country’s largest ethnic group, have continually brought the issue to the forefront.  
While the extensive amendments to the former 1949 constitution in 1989-1990 and the 1993 
minority law have definitely placed Hungary in leading position in European comparison, in 
terms of granting extended and collective minority rights as well as autonomy (Pan-Pfeil 
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2002), the discussions around the nature of minority policies have been revived and have 
become more intense since the 2010 parliamentary elections, as the unprecedented two-third 
parliamentary majority of the new right-wing government, as part of its efforts to further 
consolidate the state, redefined the basis of the political community, solidified and codified 
traditional values and norms, has passed a new constitution (Fundamental Law)1 and in 
accordance with the new constitutional provisions a new law on the rights of minorities2 
replaced the former 1993 law by the end of 2011. Both the design and some parts of the recent 
legislation on minorities have provoked serious international and domestic critical reactions, 
particularly since from a predominantly civic definition of the nation they have moved 
towards the ethnocultural conceptions. While the domestic minorities are invariably 
recognized as organic part of the political community and some forms of preferential 
parliamentary representation are provided for them, however, the shift to an ethnic approach 
inherently affect their political opportunities and institutional framework, and for some the 
country not only runs the risk of democratic backsliding, but also the recent changes can be 
considered a setback in the level of minority protection a few years after the EU accession, 
too. 
Addressing the issues above, the purpose of this article is twofold: first, in line with the 
theoretical and empirical findings on democratic consolidation, Europeanization and post-
accession compliance, the following sections primarily aim to evaluate which of the 
approaches, such as backsliding on minority rights protection, the opposite “Euro-straitjacket” 
theory, or the idea of promoting the social inclusion would best explain this particular case. 
This part of the analysis, however, immediately faces the question of whether and how the 
direct impact of the EU on this particular domain of minority protection can be assessed while 
the acquis, with the exception of antidiscrimination regulations, does not address or provide 
standards for these issues. Therefore, instead of a more generalized picture, the present study 
can provide a narrower focus by examining how changes in four key areas – constitutional 
provisions, language rights and cultural autonomy, and parliamentary representation – were 
managed and/or resolved that were reflected either in the regular reports on Hungary’s 
progress toward the EU or in the resolutions on the implementation of the Framework 
                                                          
1
 In English: The Fundamental Law of Hungary (as of 1 October 2013) 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf  
(accessed 3 November 2014).  
2
 Act 179 of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF%282012%29014-e (accessed 3 
November 2014).  
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Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and in the recommendations on the 
application of the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, two important international 
instruments of minority protection.  
Second, the analysis that follows goes beyond the widely held view that the rise of identity 
politics and ethnic conflicts has traditionally posed a threat to democratization and 
consolidation in the Central and Eastern European region, but the main contribution of the 
article is in pointing out that uncertainties around community boundaries may also become a 
barrier to successful consolidation, albeit from a different perspective, the above shift to foster 
the ethnocultural understanding of citizenship and nation can be also considered as an attempt 
to consolidate the Hungarian state and strengthen national solidarity. Therefore, the paper on 
the other hand seeks to explore the recent political and institutional changes and critically 
assess their potential impact and challenges they might pose for the domestic minorities, with 
particular emphasis on the question of whether and how group boundaries and uncertainties in 
identifying in- and out-group members can be understood in this context. Particularly since 
the recent changes in the political opportunity structure have the potential by themselves to 
both upgrade the role of minorities in Hungary, to strengthen their weak ethnic identification, 
but possibly to differentiate and distance them from the ethnic majority. Besides the 
increasing ethnic identification, as it will be demonstrated by the latest census data, it further 
aims to map and analyse the reactions of both external actors, particularly EU bodies and 
internal minorities to these new political and institutional challenges. 
II. Democratic Consolidation, Management of Ethnocultural Diversity and Their 
Implications for Hungary 
According to Linz and Stepan, the term ‘democratic consolidation’ refers to a political 
situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become “the only game in town”, especially 
when behaviourally “no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the 
democratic regime or secede from the state.” Attitudinally, the state of consolidated 
democracy can be achieved when, “even in the face of severe political and economic crises, 
the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must 
emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas”, and thirdly, in constitutional 
terms, democracy may acquire the dominant position when “all the actors in the polity 
become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the 
established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and 
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costly” (1996: 5). The concept, however, does not necessarily imply that there could only one 
type of consolidated democracies: what researchers can observe instead is a process starting 
from the transition, a continuum ranging from lesser (such as ‘partial regimes’ or ‘defective 
democracies’) to a greater level of democratic consolidation. Further, it appears to be widely 
accepted in the literature that the concept goes beyond the compliance with the formal 
requirements, and in fact consolidation involves a deeper, broad-ranging and longer process 
than democratic transition that is, as a general rule, influenced by various internal and external 
actors, and implicates the stabilization, routinization, institutionalization and legitimation of 
democratic structures and practices as well as the spreading and rooting of democratic values 
and behaviours (Pridham 2008: 450, 2009: 467-468).  
In terms of diversity management, the contribution of Linz and Stepan lies in adding the 
issues of stateness and nationalism to the main areas of democratic consolidation, since 
democratic consolidation is more likely to be more difficult for heterogeneous countries than 
more homogeneous ones where disputes over state boundaries and polity may not arise. The 
ethnopolitical debates, the mobilization of the population along ethnic lines, and the formation 
of minority parties could be indeed much more provoked by the Post-Communist states’ 
parallel state- and nation-building projects that have tended to secure primarily the 
institutional positions of the majoritarian language and culture (Kymlicka 2004). 
The latter phenomenon was, however, just partially true for the post-transition Hungary 
where, initially, in 1920, 11% of the ca. 8 million inhabitants belonged to minorities, by now, 
according to census data from 2001 and 2011, the percentage of persons belonging to the 13 
officially recognized minorities grew from 5 percent to 6.5% of the population (ca. 650 
thousands of people) (see Table 2)3, showing at first glance some increase in the level of 
minority consciousness but others remain sceptical about data. On one hand, it is still in 
contrast with the estimates of the minority organizations which, being virtually interested in 
growing the size and political weight, seem to take less into account the assimilation that went 
on during the previous century. However, the fact alone that the estimated number is at least 
twice as high as the official figures reveals the relatively high level of uncertainty surrounding 
minority identities in Hungary. On the other hand, some point out that it is difficult to make 
                                                          
3
 The method of the two latest censuses provided the possibility of recording dual and multiple affiliations since 
in 2001 three, and in 2011 two (anonymous and voluntary) responses could be given to the four (in 2011 three) 
questions regarding ethnicity, but the Statistical Office does not publish separately the primary and secondary 
affiliations.   
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comparisons due to different census methodology, and more importantly, the vast majority of 
them declared themselves to be Hungarian, too, so it is an open question that if just one 
response would have been given to each question, which affiliation would they have 
preferred?4 Thirdly, some imply their doubts whether the question on language use in family 
and among friends may be appropriate to assess ethnic belongings. Most probably, with the 
exception of Roma and Germans it is still questionable whether there is any such dissimilation 
in most of the cases. In addition, for greater compatibility experts may rely on the number of 
registered MSG voters as other primary sources, but since only adult Hungarian citizens had 
the right to register for MSG elections, the number of minority voters was not below the 
census data in all the cases. That difference, to some extent, accounts for weak minority 
loyalties, but on the other hand it may indicate electoral abuses, too. 
                                                          
4
 On account of this close association with both the state and the Hungarian majority, scholars often portray their 
identities as dual, being composed of both ethnic minority and Hungarian elements, thereby distinguishing them 
from the more numerous and nationally conscious minority Hungarian communities in the neighbouring states. 
 
 7 
Table 2: the censuses of 2001 and 2011 regarding national and ethnic minorities, and the number of registered minority voters at the 2006 and 
2010 MSG elections  
Minority Nationality 
(ethnicity) 
Native language Language used 
among friends, in 
family 
Affinity 
with 
cultural 
values, 
traditions 
Persons Registered MSG voters 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2001 2011 2006 2010 
Bulgarian 1.358 3.556 1.299 2.899 1.118 2.756  1.693 2.316 6.272 2.110 2.088 
Roma 189.984 308.957 48.438 54.339 53.323 61.143  129.259 205.720 315.583 106.333 133.492 
Greek 2.509 3.916  1.921 1.872 1.974 2.346  6.140 6.619 4.642 2.451 2.267 
Croat 15.597 23.561  14.326 13.716 14.788 16.053  19.715 25.730 26.774 11.090 11.571 
Polish 2.962 5.730  2.580 3.049 2.659 3.815  3.983 5.144 7.001 3.061 3.052 
German 62.105 131.951  33.774 38.248 53.040 95.661  88.416 120.344 185.696 45.983 46.629 
Armenian 620 3.293  294 444 300 496  836 1.165 3.571 2.361 2.357 
Romanian 7.995 26.345  8.482 13.886 8.215 17.983  9.162 14.781 35.641 4.404 5.277 
Ruthene 1.098 3.323 1.113 999 1.068 1.131 1.292 2.079 3.882 2.729 4.228 
Serb 3.816 7.210 3.388 3.078 4.186 5.713 5.279 7.350 10.038 2.143 2.432 
Slovak 17.693 29.647 11.817 9.888 18.057 16.266 26.631 39.266 35.208 15.049 12.282 
Slovene 3.025 2.385 3.180 1.723 3.119 1.745 3.442 4.832 2.820 991 1.025 
Ukrainian 5.070 5.633 4.885 3.384 4.519 3.245 4.779 7.393 7.396 1.084 1.338 
Source: Csordás 2014: 16-18. For the minority elections: www.valasztas.hu 
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The trend that emerges when comparing the two latest census data is the shift to prioritizing 
ethnic and cultural belongings over minority language use. For instance, the most extreme 
case is associated with the highly assimilated Slovak minority: only 30% of people declaring 
Slovak to at least one of the four questions in 2001, declared Slovak to be their native 
language. The overall assessment of these dominantly Hungarian-speaking minority groups 
whose identities usually involve cultural ties and less linguistic affiliations is an exciting issue 
especially in the broader Central and Eastern European context where the tradition of defining 
communities in ethnocultural terms has strongly prevailed since the rise of nationalism and 
modern nation-states. While there has been a long-lasting, traditional discussion in the 
Hungarian political thought even since the 19th century on the boundaries as well as the 
potential characteristics of the Hungarian nation, too, the presence of the mostly Hungarian-
speaking subgroups of certain communities (like Roma5, Armenians), and the vague nature of 
ethnic identities has often given rise to debates over the complexity of belongings and the so-
called “ethnobusiness”. The contestation over group boundaries played a significant role at 
the minority elections, too, because not only the wider public but the different minority 
subgroups often tended to accuse each other with ethnobusiness. Within certain communities 
a recent phenomenon also contributes to the debates that the proportions of those persons who 
belong to the specific minority but were born abroad and are non-Hungarian citizens (or 
possessing dual citizenship) have become significant (Tóth-Vékás 2009). This explains the 
minorities’ years-long efforts to extend the application of minority law to foreign citizens 
established in Hungary, who usually have favourable socioeconomic positions, are well-
educated, have better native language skills, close ties to the kin-states, and stronger ethnic 
identities. Their attempts to contribute to minority public life, to the work of MSGs, however, 
caused tensions in certain cases.  
Despite the high number of registered ethnic parties since 1989,6 their electoral failures reflect 
accurately the situation that in Hungary the ethnic components of personal identities generally 
                                                          
5
 According to the latest census results from 2011, approximately 315 thousands of people declared themselves 
as Roma, about 3 percent of the total population but their estimated number is at least twice as high. The 
overwhelming majority is Hungarian-speaking, while the others speak either some variants of Romani or an 
ancient Romanian dialect, the Beash. 
6
 The number of ethnopolitical parties that were registered by county courts between 1989 and 2014 is more than 
30, although the legal framework does not recognize them as separate entities within political parties, and that is 
why, interestingly, the participation of these minority parties at the minority elections is prohibited by law. With 
one exception, the Nationality Forum which was formed by Croat, German and Slovak minority leaders in 1998, 
all of them were created by Roma. Only one-third of the parties were able to run at least one candidate in at least 
one of the past parliamentary elections, but none of them could win a mandate.   
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have little impact on the individuals’ political interests and voting preferences. In the light of 
other factors, such as the electoral system, the minorities’ numerical and territorial conditions, 
weak identities it was obvious that their representation in major decision-making bodies could 
only be accomplished in a preferential manner. Generally, with the exception of Roma who 
have to face various social and discriminatory problems, similar types of challenges in 
everyday life as other Roma in the broader region (Bernát 2009), minorities have been well-
integrated into the Hungarian society in socioeconomic terms. In addition, openly anti-
minority forces, right-wing radicals which might trigger large-scale minority mobilization – 
until recently – had only a small representation in the parliament.  
III. Post-Accession Compliance in Hungary  
It has become widely accepted that combining political conditionality during the accession 
with significant political and economic incentives to candidate states proved to be the most 
effective and unprecedented approach in promoting democracy in the Post-communist region 
(Pop-Eleches 2007). Although the lack of clear conditions in the field of minority protection 
where the EU as such lacks competence resulted in a relatively few number of concrete 
decisions, legislative changes (most notably, with the exception of antidiscrimination 
legislations), furthermore, it even could have confused the impact (Grabbe 2002). Instead, 
conditionality much more aimed at shaping and improving the discursive context, kick-
starting a dynamic process through which domestic actors, minority communities could be 
also effectively involved in the decision-making. A number of case studies have already 
demonstrated that domestic political constellations and pressures were much more influential 
factors on the outcomes (Sasse 2005).  
Since the EU enlargement, consequently, the dominant focus of the relevant literature has 
shifted to studying the post-accession compliance in the new member-states, given the 
relatively weak and limited nature of the EU mechanisms to sanction its members. It has 
become even more widespread to distinct pre- and post-accession rationales. Moreover, 
concerns have been raised shortly after the enlargement whether democratic norms have 
become widely accepted and used especially when the powerful incentives of EU membership 
and its benefits are no longer present (Mayrgündter 2012, Pop-Eleches 2007: 150, Schulze 
2010), and the costs of adaptation, the impact of veto players against reforms tend to be more 
influential.  
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For some, certain events and trends in the recent post-accession years were important warning 
signs and let to draw the conclusion that these could demonstrate backsliding with respect to 
democracy. Still others remain sceptical about a potential and general backsliding, agree only 
upon the slowdown in reforms, and either found no empirical evidence before the global 
economic crisis supporting this claim, arguing among others that candidates themselves did 
not outperform during the access process (Levitz-Pop-Eleches 2010) or asserted the contrary 
that compliance was stronger in the new member-states (Sedelmeier 2008). Although the EU 
accession has apparently brought the resurgence of radical parties in the region, they mostly 
have modest support (Vachudova 2008). In similar vein, in studying Estonia and Slovakia, 
Agarin and Regelmann have observed a high level of political continuity, and claimed that for 
these countries “EU membership was a step on the way to achieving a more covert, yet more 
subtle policy objective” (2012: 447). In contrast to backsliding theory, the ‘Euro-straitjacket’ 
theory is more optimistic about the long-term and positive effects of accession and holds that 
EU not only gives strong support to the adoption of democratic norms in the members but 
greatly privileges those parties which share a strong commitment to democracy. Advocates of 
this idea argue that since even some populist and less committed forces had to adopt the EU 
rules and use the EU language, and thus, it seems to corroborate their view. Nevertheless it is 
still in question whether it is feasible to measure and how to compare the pre- and post-
accession performance of the countries concerned in the particular area of minority protection.   
As Koinova notes, the relevant literature on the relationship between the EU and the 
candidates is often based on the assumption that democracy is the “major game in town” 
(2011: 807), therefore, this can greatly explain why the debate on the state of democracy as 
well as on certain recent legislations, including the new media law or the new constitution, in 
particular, whether they are in full conformity with EU values could be a challenging issue for 
EU bodies. Both the Venice Commission and the European Parliament raised concerns on the 
transparency, openness and inclusiveness of the adoption process of the Fundamental Law 
and on several provisions. The latter in one of its 2011 resolution called on the Hungarian 
authorities, among others, to guarantee “the equal protection of the rights of every citizen” 
and to “ensure that the reorganization of the system of parliamentary commissioners will not 
serve to water down the existing guarantees” concerning the promotion and protection of 
minority rights.7 A half year later, in another resolution the EP instructed the Committee on 
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 European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution. P7_TA(2011)0315.  
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Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to follow up and report the issue of whether and 
how the recommendations have been implemented.8 The final adopted report while 
acknowledging among other the long historical tradition of peaceful coexistence of diverse 
groups and the role of the Hungarian Government in launching the European Framework of 
National Roma Inclusion Strategy during its EU presidency in 20119, raised serious concerns 
about discrimination, hate speech and racial violence and urged the active implementation of 
the relevant legislation.10 
IV. The Recent Legislative Changes and Their Implications for the Minorities 
IV. 1. The New Constitutional Provisions  
The political-legal measures of the new right-wing government that came into power in 2010 
have brought serious changes in various fields in a very short time and at the peak of them 
there is the new Fundamental Law adopted in April 2011. As regards its formulation, the 
Venice Commission criticized the rapidity of the process, and the significant lack of 
transparency and public debates.11 Obviously the situation of the minorities could not remain 
unaffected either, and the new constitutional provisions, coupled with the new law on 
minorities, have changed the institutional arrangement to a large extent. Besides returning to 
the term ‘nationalities’ that was in use before 1990, as noted above, the Fundamental Law 
moreover represents a serious shift in the concept of nation: until its adoption, at the political-
legal level, the civic-neutral concept appeared in the legal measures which defined the 
common entity in terms of citizenship, while the ethnocultural understanding of the nation 
became much more influential in public discourse after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, and it 
could regain its influence during the transition.  
Like most of the other constitutions in the region, both the previous and the recent Hungarian 
constitution illustrate well how difficult it is to define the political community and reconcile 
the different concepts of the nation (Batory 2010, Coakley 2011, Deets 2005, Dimitrijević 
2002), and like many of them the latter one also seems to prefer the etnocultural 
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 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012 on the recent political developments in Hungary. 
P7_TA(2012)0053.  
9
 In this regard see Vizi 2011.  
10
 European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices 
in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012). P7_TA(2013)0315.  
11
 Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 17-18 June 2011). 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD%282011%29016-e.pdf 
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conceptualization. The previous law combined the civic-neutral term ‘people’ with the 
national-ethnic approach (Deets 2005): it declared that the supreme power was vested in the 
people, and the national and ethnic minorities to be constituent part of the state and the 
paramount duty of the state to protect them,12 but, interestingly enough, it referred only 
indirectly to the presence of the overwhelming Hungarian majority, especially in the 
‘responsibility clause’ for the fate of Hungarians living abroad.13 By contrast, the new 
Preamble, the National Avowal that still recognizes “the nationalities living with us” as state 
constituents, is written in the name of “we the members of the Hungarian nation”, and 
therefore it follows, according to the opinion of the Venice Commission,14 that ethnic 
Hungarians share the power with the nationalities who are not part of the people behind the 
adoption, while in fact several national MSGs expressed their opinions during the 
formulation. It further states that “our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal order: 
it shall be a covenant among Hungarians past, present and future; a living framework which 
expresses the nation’s will and the form in which we want to live.” The more pronounced 
responsibility for the Hungarian minorities as well as the much disputed provision that, 
contrary to the previous constitution, declares Hungarian as official language to be 
protected,15 also indicate the intention to strengthen the ethnic elements.  
The returning to the term ‘nationalities’ was officially justified partly as an effort to go 
beyond the dichotomy of majority versus minorities by highlighting how minority 
communities with their distinct ethnocultural features add to the entire culture of both the 
Hungarian state and nation, besides, that the term have long formed part of the legal tradition 
but were parts of the proposals of the minorities and the minority ombudsman, too. The 
Fundamental Law, furthermore, takes over provisions from the previous constitution, 
including minorities’ rights to use their native languages, names, to promote their cultures, to 
be educated in their mother tongue and to create local and national MSGs, but does not 
declare their general protection and collective participation in public life, moreover, it 
terminated the independent position of the Minority Rights Ombudsman. Instead it aims to fill 
a significant gap in the institutional framework when it states that minorities shall contribute 
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 Article 2 (2). 68 (1)-(2). Article 68 (1).   
13
 Article 6 (3).   
14
 Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 17-18 June 2011). http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD%282011%29016-e.pdf See also Pap 
2011.  
15
 Article (H), Article XXIX (1).  
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to parliament’s work.16 With respect to preventing electoral abuses it declares that those 
Hungarian citizens who belong to any nationality shall have the right to freely express and 
preserve their identities.  
IV. 2. Minority language rights and cultural autonomy 
The new minority law has made sustained efforts to further develop the model of non-
territorial autonomy and attempted to solve those problems and issues that were addressed by 
the resolutions and recommendations on the implementation of both the Framework 
Convention and the Language Charter. First of all, critical voices of the international bodies 
highlighted the need to prevent electoral abuses at the minority elections, and strengthen the 
institutional framework and financial guarantees of the autonomy.17  
Although the relevant legislation is still based on the principle of free choice of identity, it 
lacks any further safeguards to prevent electoral abuses, but continuing the struggle against 
ethnobusiness, the most relevant change is that from 2014, at the local level, an election may 
be called only when the number of minority individuals of a given community reaches 25 
according to the latest census results. These results will, furthermore, play an important role in 
relation to language rights and the financial support granted to local MSGs. The latter is 
particularly important in specifying those administrative and judicial districts where minority 
speakers can use their languages in contact with authorities.18   
Act 131 of 2010 on Preparing New Legislation and on Public Discussions on Drafts has 
limited the scope of minority veto power. Indeed, there has been a shift from the previous 
right of consent (approval) to the right of consultation. Reflecting the new circumstances, the 
Minister for Public Administration and Justice and the national MSGs signed a strategic 
partnership agreement in 2011. Minority bodies can still run their own educational and 
cultural institutions, but all the other schools have been taken over by the state and are now 
managed and maintained by a national body.   
                                                          
16
 Article 2 (2).  
17
 See for instance Resolution ResCMN(2005)10 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities by Hungary (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 December 2005 
at the 951st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).   
18
 See for instance Recommendation RecChL(2010)3 of the Committee of Ministers on the application of the 
European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages by Hungary (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
10 March 2010 at the 1079th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).  
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The system of allocating central financial support to MSGs has been also modified. First, 
there has been a change in the ratios: one third of the total amount is granted for core 
functions based on the latest 2011 census data; the remaining amount is granted on the basis 
of the activity history of each applicant.19 Further, minority organizations are eligible to apply 
annually to a fund supporting their cultural and linguistic activities.    
IV. 3. Contribution to the work of the Parliament 
The realisation of the right to parliamentary representation, which was a specific provision in 
the 1993 law, was the main political and legal demand of the minorities in Hungary after 
1990. Despite many drafts and various domestic and international critiques, the aim was never 
realized. According to the new law on elections, in the mixed electoral system, those voters 
who are registered in minority electoral rolls have the right to vote for their candidates in the 
single-mandate constituencies and for the minority lists drawn up by the national self-
governments. In such cases the 5% threshold is not applied, but they are entitled to one seat if 
they receive at least 25% of an electoral quota, thereby reducing the number of MPs to be 
elected on party lists.20 It follows that this preferential system mostly favours larger 
communities. As the latest parliamentary elections in April 2014 clearly showed, however, 
even these minorities had to work hard to attract their potential voters. Minority lists that fail 
to win preferential mandates, are still entitled to a parliamentary spokesperson, which, 
however, does not have voting rights. Minority MPs and spokespersons can found permanent 
parliamentary committees, pursuant to the new law on the Parliament.21 
V. Conclusions  
The study aimed at better understanding how Hungary fits into the broader context of Post-
Communist state- and nation-building, consolidation as well as post-accession processes in 
terms of minority protection. In the four studied areas (language rights, cultural autonomy, 
and parliamentary representation) the paper has found no clear evidence that post-accession 
compliance has inevitably led to backsliding in Hungary. Rather, what can be observed is on 
one hand the anti-egalitarian and less inclusive nature of the new constitution which places 
lesser importance on equality and antidiscrimination and terminated the independent position 
of the Minority Rights Ombudsman. On the other hand, the general line of internal minority 
                                                          
19
 Governmental decree 428/2012. (29th December).   
20
 Act 203 of 2011 on the elections of members of Parliament of Hungary.    
21
 Act 36 of 2012 on the Parliament of Hungary.  
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policy has followed the same path since the adoption of the new legislation by further 
developing the non-territorial autonomy and providing some kind solution to the lack of 
parliamentary representation.  
Yet, one of the major question within the highly assimilated internal minority groups is 
whether such recent legal, political and social changes, like the ethnocultural definition of the 
nation, the further improvement of the autonomy, the transnational migration processes, and 
the opportunities of study and work abroad will eventually lead to preferring the ethnic 
elements, to more conscious communities, and to an increasing need for the better 
implementation of minority rights or, on the contrary, facilitates the strengthening the 
Hungarian components of minority identities. Further, since many assess the socio-
demographic processes as a gradual and irreversible assimilation process, a view supported by 
the relevant census data on the decline of minority language use, the question arises as to 
whether the creation of the Hungarian model was too late to slow down and possibly reverse 
these tendencies. While public opinion is critical of the somewhat exaggerated phenomenon 
of ethnobusiness,22 the support given by the parliamentary parties to the system of MSGs is 
also favourable to the maintenance of the Hungarian model. 
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